A DAO should be more flexible, not fixed by rigid rules, and we can negotiate this proposal instead of meaningless quarrels
@Bruce No need to delete this proposal, that’s not even possible once voting has started. This is still a valid SEP, as it stands.
Let’s first let this proposal voting period finish. Then we’ll probably have a long crypto winter to discuss next steps and see when the community would like to bring this up to a vote again. I don’t think a Discourse poll here would be representative, would it? Might be a good idea to give it time to review the comments already made in this thread, posted on Twitter, the comments next to Snapshot votes and being it to the next community calls happening every two weeks.
Don’t do “community call” via zoom, you should know that most community members don’t use it.
If you really want a community call, use Discord or Twitter Space.
That’s helpful feedback, we were torn between Zoom & YouTube, Discord and Twitter Spaces. If you have more feedback about the previous community calls, let me know!
What ? How ? 10 days its people not vote and now ?) theobtl , i dont have words …
I’ve voted “Make no changes” on the proposal based on the following thoughts - as outlined in my Delegate Thread:
- I believe in the potential of Protocol Owned Liquidity, where a DAO actively holds and manages some of the Liquidity of its native token (and other tokens it deems valuable) to benefit from the market-making rewards and influence that comes with it. I see the moment of unpausing the token as a good opportunity to establish Protocol owned Liquidity. Depending on the assets that SafeDAO will control in the following months, I suggest SafeDAO host a Gnosis Auction or Balancer LBP right before tokens unlock to A. Have price exploration take place before tokens unlock B. To gain some counter assets that can be used to continue LPing SAFE after unpausing.
After the unpausing, I suggest creating a liquidity pool on Balancer with the gained assets from the Auction/LBP as many allies of Safe (such as GnosisDAO) already hold a substantial amount of veBAL and can help increase rewards to and depth of a SAFE pool on Balancer. There are also ways to further enhance returns and depth of the pool by integrating it into the Aura system - which I think would be valuable to SafeDAO.
- Next to the lost opportunity to gain PoL - I am worried about the current market conditions and the pressures it may create. As many stakeholders are down substantially, they may be forced to liquidity share of their SAFE tokens. I suggest unlocking in a less volatile market to allow stakeholders to make well-thought decisions about whether they hold on to their SAFE tokens or not.
- Finally, I think unpausing after the claim window closes is better - as it provides more clarity to stakeholders that want to come into the SAFE ecosystem about circulating supply and the number of tokens held by each stakeholder group.
I would suggest continuing this conversation - discussing whether we want and can host an Auction/LBP and ensuring all stakeholders (including investors and possible exchanges) are set before we unpause the token.
I’ve never seen any project claiming to be a public good that allocates so little voting power (2.9%) to users and then allocates a lot of voting power to investors and guardians at token launch.
The total voting power of all users participating in this vote is probably not as much as this 8M voter (I think this should be an investor).
For most products, voting power will not be allocated to investors if the initial investor tokens are not unlocked. And Safe Team gives investors the most voting power from the start, I don’t understand what’s the point of investors’ tokens being unlocked in July next year, investors can veto all proposals to enable token transferability before July next year.
Acknowledge that this is a centralized dictatorship, not a DAO.
Seeing this kind of voting, I think it is an insult to users, if you think users are not important, you can not airdrop, instead of letting insiders play with users like pets.
how much token safe you have?
My understanding is that there are two bugs:
- If your safe was created with factory v1.0.0 your vote won’t count.
- If you used the new Safe UI (before it was fixed) your vote won’t count.
(2) has since been fixed, but I don’t know that (1) has.
He has about 190k tokens, I think someone like him deserves more voting power, he knows if and when to enable transferability, and provided a specific plan, much better than those who hold a lot of voting power but can’t even provide a convincing reason.
That’s right, the result of this vote is not important now, this is an unfair vote.
theobtl](Profile - theobtl - Safe Community Forum)
I believe that the vote was dishonest, since there was a BAG. Whether it affected the final result or not, the fact that the process was broken.
My suggestion is to start a new vote after the token claims are spent on December 28th. On December 29, people will be able to vote and in the new year 23, the token can be unpaused. I think it would be fair, what do you say?
Also, my opinion (only opinion) is to exclude people who have more than 2 million tokens, because 2000 people with 1000 tokens can create 2 million tokens and only 1 will create 8. We do not have the ability to buy tokens so that we can talk about honesty, and if this person continues to use the amount of his tokens to lobby for his interests, it will be nonsense! This is what we all talked about, GLOBAL DICTATORY when in the hands of a couple of people the key to control the DAO.
These makes sense to me
disappointing vote, don’t know how could things going like this…
What’s the point of governance if voting only takes a few people to decide?
Like 2 people over 50% voting rights?
This is a valid point, but a longer discussion for sure. When @nodeE brought this point up two days ago, we discussed it quite a bit. It just seems to be the case that there are different ideas about how SafeDAO’s governance should be designed. Although I think we all agree that SafeDAO’s governance is early, immature and can be improved.
When you say that not being able to buy voting power is a problem, I’m not sure if everyone would agree. It’s for a reason that ‘soulbound tokens’ have become quite popular recently when the default state is that the richest and most liquid individual can buy the most voting power. This is also extremely contradictive to the idea of one-person, one-vote which you have argued for as well before.
At the end of the day, I’m not sure that the wider community (not only those actively commenting here) would want to get rid of the current system completely. Guardians earned their status based on valuable contributions to the Safe ecosystem. Instead of getting rid of it, we may be better advised to keep and fundamentally improve it?
There are also lots of other exciting, innovative experiments happening around DAO governance, such as:
Now that SEP-2 is off the table for now is a good time to discuss these and work towards a governance framework for SafeDAO that is state of the art.
In parallel to working on a governance framework (and potentially other fundamental proposals), I’d suggest we go back to the drawing board and agree on which conditions we want to see met before there will be a second vote on enabling transferability.
Below is a collection of arguments people shared above on this thread:
I agree that most of the people are asking to start voting on December 28, immediately after the unclaimed tokens are returned to the DAO.
Regarding the defenders, I understand that they deserve their tokens, BUT the problem is not that they have so many tokens, but the problem is that we are not equal with them, for example:
2 defenders can have a total of 10 million tokens, and 1000-2000 people can give that much in total.
And now the question is whether the opinion of 2-3 defenders and 2000 people is equal? Let’s imagine that the DAO is a kingdom (God save the queen) and imagine that the kingdom is headed by 3 defenders who have ±10 million tokens, and the kingdom has 2000 citizens.
And so the king decides to raise taxes and votes as a result of 2000 people are equal to only 2 defenders and the vote of the 3rd defender tips the scales. The vote, as it were, was held and the king can say that this is the choice of the people, but is it not clear that the people do not decide anything? The number of votes cannot be bought, and thus we have a dictatorship.
I suppose you will say that if the tokens were on sale, a large investor (Big FISH) could buy votes and thus also lobby their interests, yes! But only then would everyone have the opportunity to buy votes, and so you handed votes to people about whom we know nothing and during the last vote they do not hear us. 1600+ people FOR and ± 130 people against.
I believe that the DAO is not 130 people, but more than 2100 members, and most of them were FOR. I believe that DECENTRALIZATION involves FREEDOM and not a point distribution of gold in 1 hand!
I was looking forward to Safe governance. I’m not so sure anymore.
What is happening here with the vote?
There are two addresses with no on-chain history and they have 12M votes. I don’t mind if what I vote for doesn’t get chose, however, this is a clear red flag.
Can someone help me make sense of these two addresses?
Seeing as there are concern around the voting power of the minority user group, how about making a proposal to redistribute unclaimed airdrop tokens equally among wallets that participated in the snapshot votes up until the claiming period ends?
- encourages more users to claim and participate
- gives more voting power to those that want to participate
- the additional voting power to the minority is not enough to outweigh the top ten wallets
- adds more tokens into circulation
- those that delegated would be excluded